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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
BE CONSIDERED BY SCHOOL BoARD IN CORRECTING IMBALANCE IN NEW SCHOOL DISTRICT

RACIAL FACTOR MAY

In 1960, the Board of Education of New York City was authorized to
build a new junior high school to relieve overcrowding in the Brooklyn area.
The school was deliberately located in a fringe area with the intention of includ-,
ing children from three racial or ethnic groups. Rejecting an earlier plan,1 the
head of the Central Zoning Unit developed the present plan considering the
element of racial imbalance among other relevant factors. This second plan, as
adopted by the Board, achieved an attendance ratio of approximately one third
each of the three racial or ethnic groups.2 The children for whom this action was
brought were starting their first year in junior high school and, but for the
rezoning, would have attended a different neighborhood school. Petitioners3
brought this action for review of the Board's plan,4 and argued that exclusion of
their children from the old neighborhood school because of race contravened
the state education and antidiscrimination laws.5 They also alleged that the
Board's consideration of race in formulating the new zone violated the equal
protection clause of the federal and state constitutions. 6 The Supreme Court,
Special Term, confined its holding to the first issue and annulled the Board's
plan because it violated the Education Law.7 The Appellate Division, considering
both the statutory and constitutional arguments, found no violation and
reversed the lower court.8 Affirming the Appellate Division's decision, the Court
of Appeals held, that consideration of the factor of racial imbalance by a board
of education in adopting a zoning plan was not arbitrary or unconstitutional.
Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert.
denied, 85 S.Ct 148 (1964).
The action of the Board of Education in the instant case involved a
consideration of race in zoning a school district with the intent to provide an
1. The initial plan was rejected by the Board of Education because the new school
would not have been centrally located and because the plan failed to accord adequate
consideration to the factor of racial imbalance. The ratio of attendance under the initial
plan would have been 52% Negro, 34% Puerto Rican, and 14% White.
2. Specifically, the attendance ratio is 35.2% Negro, 33.6% Puerto Rican, and 31.2%
White.
3. Petitioners are the parents of two children of junior high school age who live in the
disputed district. The action was brought for these two white children and others similarly
situated.
4. N.Y. CPLR § 7801.
5. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3201, provides, "No person shall be refused admission into or
be excluded from any public school in the state of New York on account of race, creed,
color, or national origin." N.Y. Civil Rights Law, §§ 40 and 41, proscribe discrimination in
public accommodations on the basis of race.
6. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; N.Y. Const. art. I, §§ 6 and 11.
7. Balaban v. Rubin, 40 Misc. 2d 249, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
8. 20 A.D.2d 438, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574 (2d Dep't 1964).
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equal educational opportunity to all children concerned. Analysis of this case
should include both the Board's consideration of race and the requirement of an
equal opportunity to state education. The guarantee of an equal opportunity to
state provided education was enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education.0 In
that case, the Supreme Court declared that separate educational facilities could
never be equal. It concluded that if a state provided educational opportunities,
they must be made available to all on equal terms. The Court held that state
action denying such an opportunity because of race violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10 The Brown decision focused on state
imposed separation of school children because of race. When confronting de
facto segregation, i.e., separation of children caused by existing racial imbalance
in residential patterns and not by requirement of the state, federal and state
courts have varied in their interpretation of Brown. The federal courts have held
that absent any official state action causing the segregation, no constitutional
duty compels a board of education to attempt to remedy the condition." However, on a showing of some state action causing or maintaining segregation,
some federal courts require affirmative corrective action. 2 According to these
courts, a board of education must use its authority to locate school zones in
accordance with constitutional principles.'3 State courts have generally held that
corrective action would be required if there was any state action imposing
even in the
segregation. 14 However a California court has declared that, "...
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Id. at 495. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958); Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Griffin v. County School Board,
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
11. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Board, 317 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963); Boson v. Rippy,
285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960) (by implication); Kelley v. Board of Education, 270 F.2d 209
(6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (by implication); Bell v. School City of Gary,
213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924
(1964); Lynch v. Kenston School Dist. Board of Education, 229 F. Supp. 740 (NJ). Ohio
1964); Webb v. Board of Education, 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963) ; Evans v. Buchanan
207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962). Compare Taylor v. Board of Education, 191 F. Supp.
181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961) with Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25
(D.N.J. 1964). In the Gary case, the court suggests that, ". .. requiring certain students to
leave their neighborhood ...

and be transferred to another school ...

simply for the purpose

of balancing the races in the various schools would.. . be a violation of the equal protection
clause.... ." Bell v. School City of Gary, supra at 831.
12. Taylor v. Board of Education, supra note 11 (creating or maintaining); Blocker
v. Board of Education, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (maintaining or perpetuating).
See Branche v. Board of Education, 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). The court in
Blocker said that "in a publicly supported, mandatory state educational system, the plaintiff's have the civil right . . . not to be compelled to attend a school in which all of the
Negro children are educated separately . . . from over 997 of their white contemporaries."
Blocker v. Board of Education, supra at 227 (emphasis added). For a discussion of federal
court decisions in school segregation cases, see generally Bickel, The Decade of School
Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 193, 203-12 (1964); Hyman &
Newhouse, Desegregation of the Schools: The Present Situation, see this issue; Note, 50 Va.
L. Rev. 465, 474-84 (1964).
13. Taylor v. Board of Education, 191 F. Supp. 181, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See Blocker
v. Board of Education, supra note 12; Branche v. Board of Education, supra note 12.
14. Morean v. Board of Education, 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964) (per curiam);
Jackson v. Pasadena City School System, 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606
(1963). See generally Note, 50 Va. L. Rev. 465, 502-24 (1964).
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absence of gerrymandering or other affirmative discriminatory conduct by a
school board, a student . ..would be entitled to relief where by reason of
residential segregation, substantial racial imbalance exists in his school."1 5
New York law relating to school segregation has been developed both by
the decisions of the courts and by rulings of the state Commissioner of Education. Action by a local board of education is subject to review by the Commissioner of Education.16 Early decisions of the Commissioner on cases of alleged
discriminatory zoning indicate that a board of education has authority to zone
school attendance areas. 17 However, it must zone reasonably,' 8 within the
limits of the Constitution and of its statutory power, 19 and without an intent to
segregate.20 The fact that all the children of a neighborhood are of one race,
religion, or nationality does not require that a board gerrymander its zones to
achieve proportionate distribution. 21 On review, the Commissioner has considered
the regularity of district lines, 22 the equality of facilities in various schools, 23
traffic and health hazards, 24 transportation problems,2 5 transfer and optional
attendance policies,26 and the value of the neighborhood school plan for elementary schools. 27 Upon a finding of an intent to segregate or other abuse of

authority, the Commissioner may readjust zone boundaries. 28 However, in a
more recent case 2 9 the Commissioner declared a change of policy. In this case,
it was alleged that the pupil transfer system instituted by a school board was
inadequate to correct the serious racial imbalance existing in the school. In
passing on the claim, the Commissioner found that the local board's action was
not arbitrary and that the plan was sound. Nevertheless, he declared that racial
imbalance per se does constitute a deprivation of equal educational opportunity.30 Hence he ordered the local board to reconsider its plan in light of the
15. Jackson v. Pasadena, supra note 14, at 878, 382 P.2d at 881, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
16. N.Y. Educ. Law § 310.
17. E.g., In the Matter of Bell, 77 State Dep't Rep. 37 (Educ. Dep't 1956); In the
Matter of Hempstead, 70 State Dep't Rep. 108 (Educ. Dep't 1949); In the Matter of
Ramapo, 65 State Dep't Rep. 106 (Educ. Dep't 1943).
18. In the Matter of Hempstead, supra note 17; In the Matter of Ramapo, supra
note 17.
19. In the Matter of Hempstead, supra note 17.
20. In the Matter of Bell, 77 State Dep't Rep. 37 (Educ. Dep't 1956).
21. Id. at 38.
22. In the Matter of Ramapo, 65 State Dep't Rep. 106 (Educ. Dep't 1943).
23. In the Matter of Taylor, 1 Educ. Dep't Rep. 501 (Comm'r of Educ. 1960).
24. In the Matter of Bell, 77 State Dep't Rep. 37 (Educ. Dep't 1956); In the Matter
of Taylor, supra note 23.
25. In the Matter of Danker, 2 Educ. Dep't Rep. 513 (Comm'r of Educ. 1963).
26. In the Matter of Mitchell, 2 Educ. Dep't Rep. 501 (Comm'r of Educ. 1963); In
the Matter of Danker, supra note 25.
27. In the Matter of Bell, 77 State Dep't Rep. 37 (Educ. Dep't 1956).
28. Ibid.; In the Matter of Ramapo, 65 State Dep't Rep. 106 (Educ. Dep't 1943).
Cf. In the Matter of Miller, 78 State Dep't Rep. 60 (Educ. Dep't 1957). See N.Y. Education
Law § 311.
29. In the Matter of Mitchell, 2 Educ. Dep't Rep. 501 (Comm'r of Educ. 1963).
30. On the same day that this case was decided, the Commissioner issued a directive to
local school administrators. In it he quoted from a statement of policy issued by the State
Board of Regents,
'The State of New York has long held the principle that equal opportunity for
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change in policy. The Appellate Division, in upholding this decision, 81 declared
that a board can consider race in correcting imbalance2 2 Thus it has been
clearly expressed that equality of educational opportunity is a matter of state
concern,3 3 that this equality of opportunity is essential to our democratic
society,84 and, therefore, that corrective action must be taken.85
Discrimination also involves classifying or distinguishing a group of people
on the basis of some difference. The fourteenth amendment has traditionally
87
6
prohibited a state from using invidious, or palpably arbitrary classifications.
An explanation of this prohibition is that such a classification not only distinguishes one group but also significantly disadvantages it for no legitimate
purpose 3 8 However, a state may use classifications that are based on differences
which are related to the object of legislation." In correcting or assisting one
40
group which suffers from a distinct condition, a state may set that group apart.
New York courts have held that the law allows a wide discretion to the state in
classifying persons as long as it serves a legitimate public purpose. 41 There is
42
some indication that a classification based solely on race may not be permitted,
all children . . . is a manifestation of the vitality of our American democratic
society. . . .' The position of the Department, . . . is that the racial imbalance
existing in a school in which the enrollment is wholly or predominantly Negro
interferes with the achievement of equality of educational opportunity and must
therefor be eliminated. . . . If this is to be accomplished, there must be corrective
action in each community where such imbalance exists.
Special Message From the Commissioner of Education of New York to Local School
Administrators, June 14, 1963, as reported in 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 738-40 (1963).
31. In upholding the Commissioner's order, the Appellate Division reversed the decision
of a lower court. That court set aside the Commissioner's order because it violated section
3201 of the Education Law. Matter of Vetere, 41 Misc. 2d 200, 245 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
32. In the Matter of Vetere v. Mitchell, 21 A.D.2d 561, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d Dcp't
1964), reversing Matter of Vetere, 41 Misc. 2d 200, 245 N.Y.S.2d. 682 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
Compare Matter of Strippoli v. Bickal, 21 A.D.2d 364, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (4th Dep't 1964)
with Di Sano v. Storandt, 250 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
33. N.Y. Executive Law § 290. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law, §§ 40 and 41.
34. Statement of the New York Board of Regents quoted in Special Message of the
Commissioner of Education of New York to Local Administrators, June 14, 1963, as
reported in 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 738-40 (1963).
35. Ibid.
36. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
37. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959). See generally, Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 (1949).
38. "It is of the essence of classification that upon the class are cast burdens different
from those resting upon the general public. . . ." Atchison, Topeka & S.F.R.R. v. Matthews,
174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899). See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale
L.J. 421 (1960). In this article, Professor Black discusses this explanation in light of the
segregation decisions. He concludes that the principle to be derived from these cases is that
the equal protection clause prohibits significantly disadvantaging any group of people. Since
this is the effect of large scale segregation, such segregation is unconstitutional.
39. Royster Guano Company v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). But cf. Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1957).
40. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (dictum); Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464-65 (1957); West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1939). Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 39.
41. Bucho Holding Company v. Temporary State Housing Commission, 11 N.Y.2d
469, 182 N.E.2d 569, 230 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1960) (by implication); Schaeffer v. Montes, 37
Misc. 2d 722, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1962).
42. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1950) (dictum); Cassel v.
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or will be scrutinized carefully. 43 In reviewing classifications, the Supreme Court
has applied the presumption of reasonableness or constitutionality to the
determinations of state agencies as well as to state legislatures. 44 The burden of
rebutting that presumption falls to the party challenging the classification. It
must be shown that the agency's action was arbitrary or unreasonable and that
45
the claimant was significantly disadvantaged.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals limited review to a consideration
of the exercise of authority by the Board of Education. Petitioners argued that
the Board's action violated section 3201 of the Education Law by excluding
their children from a neighborhood school because of race. The court found that
no child was excluded from any school and that therefore no violation occurred.
The court evidently based this conclusion on the fact that a board of education
has specific statutory authority to determine school districts, 46 and interpreted
this statute as a limitation upon a child's absolute right to attend a specific
school within his district.47 The Board's power to determine attendance zones
is limited only by the requirement that it act reasonably and within the limits of
the Constitution. Finding that no child would have to travel farther to the new
school than he would have had to travel to the old neighborhood school, the
court concluded that there were no oppressive results. Since there was no
oppressive result, the Board's action was reasonable and could not be annulled.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 295 (1950) (concurring opinion) (dictum); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1885); Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960); Progress Development
Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. I1. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 286
F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961) (racial quota). But see Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 262 (8th
Cir. 1960); Kelley v. Nashville, 361 U.S. 924 (1959) (memorandum decision denying cert.).
In the Kelley case the Supreme Court denied review of a pupil-transfer plan which
explicitly recognized race as a criteria for transfer. Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Douglas and Brennan dissented, and would have granted review because of the race question. But cf. Hirabayushi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See generally, Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 355-61 (1949).
43. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928).
44. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities, 300 U.S. 55 (1937); Pacific States Box
Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
45. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (by implication) (proof of arbitrariness); Blocker v. Board of Education, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (proof of
harm); Taylor v. Board of Education, 294 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1961) (Moore J., dissenting).
Accord, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). See James v. School Board, 228 F.2d 72, 77 (4th Cir.
1960); Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87, 90 (E.D. Mich. 1958). In Evans v. Buchanan,
207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962), the court indicated that the fact of an all Negro student
body might give rise to a presumption which a school board would have to rebut. Cf. In the
Matter of Skipwith, 14 Misc. 2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1958), where the
court allowed a showing that a public school was inferior because of de facto segregation
as a defense in an action to require that Negro parents send their children to school. See
Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part III: The Gary Litigation, 59 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 121, 133-55 (1964).
46. A board of education, "Shall authorize and determine . . . the school where each
pupil shall attend." N.Y. Educ. Law § 2503 subd. 4(d). A board is also given authority
to select a site for new schools, N.Y. Educ. Law § 2556.
47. "A person over five and under twenty-one years of age is entitled to attend the
public schools maintained in the district or city in which such person resides. . .." N.Y.
Educ. Law § 3202 subd. 1.
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In.considering the charge that the Board discriminated and segregated petitioners' children in violation of the equal protection clause, the court found that
the plan did not foster or produce segregation. This finding indicates that the
court would require more than a mere consideration of race to sustain an
actionable claim of discrimination, for there were racial considerations in the
plan. And furthermore, the court's specific attention to the problem of whether
or not the plan produced oppressive results, indicates that a further requirement
for an actionable claim of discrimination is a showing of harm or oppression.
Generally the court considered that in view of the broad power to assign pupils
to specific schools, the Board of Education may choose to disregard such
imbalance or may attempt to correct it. If it chooses to remedy the situation,
the Board is limited by the requirement that it cannot cause harmful or oppressive results. The court emphatically noted that it was not considering whether a
board must remedy imbalance. Judge Van Voorhis, dissenting, indicated that
racial classification is inherently unconstitutional and always causes harm.
Given this principle, an administrative act classifying individuals is unsupportable no matter how desirable its effect. Citing a recent federal court case, 48 the
dissent noted that relief was denied because no state action caused the
imbalance in the schools. He reasoned that the converse must be true, that
where state action does cause segregation or discrimination, relief should be
granted. Judge Van Voorhis concluded that in the instant case, official state
action does segregate petitioners' children and therefor relief should be granted.
For further support, the dissent interprets Brown as prohibiting state action
excluding a child because of race and not as involving any broader principle
requiring racial balance.49
A comparison of the majority opinions of both the Appellate Division and
the Court of Appeals reveals the restrictions which the latter imposes. In noting
the Appellate Division's opinion, the Court of Appeals decision only mentions
that portion concerning the alleged statutory violations. The Appellate Division
found that there was no right to attend a specific school within a child's district,
that the Board has authority to delimit school districts, that section 3201 of the
Education Law was intended as a desegregation measure and could not be used
to foster segregation, and that therefore there was no statutory violation. This
opinion also stated that the plan is not discriminatory since within the district
each child will attend the new school regardless of race. Judge Desmond's
opinion adopted much of this analysis for the Court of Appeals, at least
implicitly. In the remainder of the Appellate Division's opinion, there is a
broad interpretation of Brown as proscribing any use of governmental power to
enforce segregation. It indicated that the Supreme Court in Brown was address48. Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963), afl'd, 324 F.2d
209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
49. See Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part M: The General Northern
Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 157, 206-07 (1963). Contra Sedler, School Segregation in the
North and West: Legal Aspects, 7 St. Louis U.L.J. 228, 266-67 (1963).
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ing itself to all kinds of school segregation, especially in its statement on the
50
is
extent of judicial review of a board's action. This reading of Brown 51
Appeals.
of
Court
the
by
used
not
was
disputed by some commentators and
Judge Desmond's opinion limited comment on Brown to a statement that it
proscribes state imposed segregation. However, there is an implication that the
principle regarding the educational value of an integrated education-which was
recognized by the Supreme Court-was also considered in Balaban. In reaching
its determination, the Court of Appeals weighed the effects of the disputed
action. The Board's consideration of race as one factor in determining the
school district's boundaries did not, demonstrably, disadvantage the white children. But it did promote, in a positive sense, the objective of equal, integrated
education for all children. 52 It is suggested that the Court of Appeals implicitly
indicated the limits on future corrective action by a board and the possible
means of challeging such action. Boards cannot cause oppression, and anyone
8
challenging a plan must show the plan to be arbitrary and oppressive. Continued use of this analysis would permit corrective action by a board and still
allow sufficient judicial supervision. Considering the recent denial of certiorari
by the Supreme Court, such ad hoc solutions may lead to ultimate approval of
corrective action.
CAnmig R. PuTRiNo

CONTRACTS

THE EFFECT

OF THE STATUTE OF FRAuDs ON AN IMPLIED CONTRACT

In November 1957, plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement by which plaintiff was to act as exclusive export manager for products
used with photographic and sound recording equipment manufactured by the
defendant. The contract was to run for one year: from January 1, 1958 until
December 31, 1958. For his services plaintiff was allowed a discount on prices
bf the items to be handled. Both parties performed under the contract that
year. Without any further express agreement the parties also carried on this
arrangement from January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and during the early
part of 1960. In April 1960, the defendant refused to accept plaintiff's services
any longer. Plaintiff brought an action in the New York Supreme Court, for
go. On reargument of Brown, the Supreme Court said, "School authorities have the
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving [local] problems; courts will
have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the ... principles." 349 U.S. 296, 299 (1955). The Appellate Division also emphasized
that boards of education were to use rezoning as one technique in effectuating the equal
educational opportunity principle. Brown v. Board of Education, supra at 300-01.
91. Compare Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General
Northern Problem, supra note 49 with Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6
Vill. L. Rev. 353 (1961).
52. Brief for N.A.A.C.P. as Amicus Curiae, p. 12.
53. See Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 539, 545-48 (1964).

285

